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I.

INTRODUCTION

For the past century, theories of regulation have been
dominated by the interaction between politics and markets. From
eras dominated by capitalism and socialism to ones featuring
nationalism and globalism, economists, political scientists and
politicians have focused on how to regulate markets to improve social
welfare, and their ideas have animated vibrant public debates. 1 Until
recent challenges from both the left and the right, the West has been
dominated by a globalist liberalism with a presumption in favor of
market ordering, plus limited political intervention where
necessary—a major expression of this philosophy has been the
adoption of policies favoring freedom of international trade and
investment.2
Algorithmic connectivity and competition has changed the
terms of trade between politics and markets in a way that upsets
current balances between regulation and markets. 3 While algorithms
have long existed, concurrent technological advances in data
†
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1
See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST OF
MAN (1992) (arguing that the world had reached a historical moment in which
these stark 20th century ideological conflicts were now over and that liberal
democracy, market capitalism and globalism had won).
2
Cf. Chantal Thomas, Law and Neoclassical Economic Development in Theory
and Practice: Toward an Institutionalist Critique of Institutionalism, 96 Cornell
L. Rev. 967, 969–70 (2011) (noting the ascendancy of the “Washington
Consensus,” described as “a blueprint for the implementation of the neoclassical
economic policies of the Chicago School: liberalization of trade, privatization of
investment, fiscal austerity, and monetary stabilization.”).
3
See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 2–4 (2015) (describing, for example,
the ways in which algorithms and “Big Data” have made consumers’ lives
increasingly transparent for big business, financial institutions, and government
agencies, but in contrast have made the workings of such organizations more
opaque to consumers, shifting the power balance among them).
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collection, interconnectivity, and computer processing have
generated a new, powerful ability to connect individuals, groups, and
firms.4 These interrelated phenomena have given rise to new forms
of algorithmic connectivity and competition that challenge and even
supplant the role of traditional markets in matching counterparties. 5
A few notable firms, such as Google, Amazon, and Facebook, have
grown powerful by exploiting these developments to become
superconnecting platforms.6 While the economic effects of matching
buyers and sellers are already tremendous, superconnectors are also
powerfully reshaping how civil society interacts in other areas. 7 In
addition to matching buyers and sellers, platforms also match authors
with readers and, increasingly, partisans with like-minded comrades. 8
Still other firms, such as Uber, Airbnb, and Match.com, use
algorithmic connectivity to link travelers, co-habitants, and seekers
of companionship.9 Part of the power of algorithmic connectivity is
reducing the time and transaction costs of traditional markets, while
simultaneously increasing the search dimensions beyond price,
quantity, and relatively coarse determinants of quality that limit
traditional market exchange.10
4

See DAVID S. EVANS & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MATCHMAKERS: THE NEW
ECONOMICS OF MULTISIDED PLATFORMS 19–20 (2016) (emphasizing that
technological change has “turbocharged” platforms that “connect potential trading
partners residing almost anywhere in the world.”).
5
Id. at 105 (describing how Uber’s algorithm sets its drivers’ fares, rather than
letting drivers negotiate with passengers, the latter being a form of market-based
pricing used for taxi and similar rides in many countries).
6
Id. at 109–18 (explaining these firms’ commitment to an “ecosystem” business
model designed to take advantage of network effects by robustly engaging
multiple sides of the platform).
7
See CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA
INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 179–97 (2016)
(describing, prior to the 2016 U.S. presidential election, how Facebook and others
firms’ behavioral targeting could be used to influence voters).
8
See Elizabeth Dwoskin & Rachel Lerman, ‘Stop the Steal’ Supporters,
Restrained by Facebook, Turn to Parler to Peddle False Election Claims,
WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 13, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/11/10/facebook-parlerelection-claims/ [https://perma.cc/NZ5A-5G6F] (describing movements of
conservative political adherents to the Parler social media platform).
9
See EVANS & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 4, at 143–48 (explaining use of
reputational scoring by platforms to match participants).
10
See Ryan Calo, Privacy and Markets: A Love Story, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
649, 650 (2016) (arguing that pre-Internet privacy norms promoted marketing
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But at the same time, the development of algorithmic
connectivity changes the relationship between international
investment, domestic governance, and individual privacy. 11
Transactions in consumer data are key to consumer targeting and
tailoring, which in turn are critical to algorithmic connectivity. 12 This
tension is increasingly expressed in the scrutiny paid to cross-border
M&A investment involving algorithmic connectivity and consumer
data transactions, particularly that of the CFIUS (“Committee on
Foreign Investment in the United States”). Recently, United States
national security reviews forced divestiture by Chinese acquirers of
Grindr (an online service for LGBTQ community members) and
health data startup PatientsLikeMe, and also blocked a Chinese firm’s
acquisition of the MoneyGram payment service.13 This short Article,
prepared in connection with a symposium focusing in part on mergers
and acquisition policy, argues that the recent burst of CFIUS action
arises from the inherent limits of consumer sovereignty and
contractarian approaches in dealing with consumer data privacy—
especially across the borders of nations with very different
approaches to using the acquired data.

II.

CHINA, AND THE CFIUS, WAKES
The CFIUS: An Origin Story

Despite its recent emergence as a focus of mergers and
acquisitions lawyers involved in United States-China investment, the
CFIUS is not a recent invention. Established in 1975 via an executive
functioning by hiding “salient but distorting information such as personal or
political commitments” that are increasingly being used to “cancel” economic
actors).
11
See PASQUALE, supra note 3, at 189–94 (arguing for steps to regulate the
interaction between these interests).
12
See O’NEILL, supra note 7, at 173 (warning that “oceans of behavioral data, in
coming years, will feed straight into artificial intelligence systems,” which will
target individual consumers, “[a]nd these will remain, to human eyes, black
boxes”).
13
Nevena Simidjiyska, CFIUS Flexes New Muscles Where Consumer Data and
Critical Technology are Involved, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE INSIGHTS (Apr. 24,
2019), https://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/cfius-flexes-new-muscleswhere-customer-data-and-critical-technology-are-involved/
[https://perma.cc/3PJQ-FJ7K].
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order by President Gerald Ford, the CFIUS is a committee with
representation from multiple executive branch departments, chaired
by the Secretary of the Treasury and tasked with reviewing certain
transactions involving foreign investment in the United States to
determine their national security implications.14
That said, the CFIUS did not always have the power and the
relevance that it has today. In fact, its history shows a certain level
of ad hoc amendment that has characterized its development. In
response to concerns about the Japanese firm Fujitsu’s proposed
acquisition of Fairchild Semiconductor, the 1988 Exon-Florio
Amendment gave the president the power to review and block foreign
investments that might harm national security; President Reagan then
delegated the review process to the CFIUS. 15 Subsequently, in 2007,
concern over the potential management of six major United States
seaports by a U.A.E.-based firm led Congress to formalize and
strengthen the CFIUS review process. 16
Recent CFIUS actions regarding Chinese firm investment in
the United States have triggered fears of a “new Cold War,” at least
in the economic sphere. 17 Similar to the Japanese and U.A.E.
investment inspired actions, the past decade has seen significant
14

See generally Exec. Order No. 11858, 3 C.F.R. (1975).
See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Exon-Florio
Amendment), Pub. L. No. 100–418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425–26 (amended 2006,
2018) (giving the president the power to block foreign investments when “there is
credible evidence that leads the President to believe that the foreign interest
exercising control might take action that threatens to impair the national
security”).
16
See Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–49,
121 Stat. 246 (formalizing the CFIUS’s membership, establishing a 45-day pretransaction review period, requiring a report to Congress and authorizing the
CFIUS to require mitigation steps, such as agreed pre-transaction divestitures).
17
See Jack Nicas, Mike Isaac & Ana Swanson, TikTok Said to Be Under National
Security Review, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/01/technology/tiktok-national-securityreview.html [https://perma.cc/3BNQ-SNP4] (describing the CFIUS review of
TikTok’s parent firm’s U.S. investment and describing it as “what some analysts
refer to as a new Cold War”); see also Dan Primack, “New Cold War” Fears Hit
Silicon Valley, AXIOS (May 24, 2019), https://www.axios.com/us-china-tradenew-cold-war-9ab805a4-bd8e-4d99-9b91-0e3495a945ba.html
[https://perma.cc/JSY8-E44N] (describing the perception among some tech firms
that “Chinese companies are no longer viewed as viable acquirers due to concerns
that the deals could be blocked by CFIUS”).
15
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changes to the CFIUS and its application that have been driven by
concern about rising Chinese investment in the United States. In
particular, inbound investment into the United States from Chinese
sources rose from less than $5 billion annually on the eve of the
Global Financial Crisis to over seven times as much one decade later;
the number of deals has increased similarly. 18 The Treasury
Department issues annual reports concerning the CFIUS’s activity,
and the public version of the most recent report details a significant
rise in overall CFIUS action (see Figure 1).
Figure 1.19

Year

Number of
Number
of Notices Investigations

2014
2015
2016
2017
2018

147
143
172
237
229

51
66
79
172
159

Notices Withdrawn and
Transactions Abandoned in
Light of CFIUS-Related
National Security Concerns
2
3
3
24
17

While the absolute numbers of transactions blocked are small,
the percentage change in a few short years is dramatic. Moreover,
these numbers may understate the CFIUS’s actual impact. Notably,
deal participants report changing their behavior due to the perception
of an increasingly active CFIUS; that is, the numbers of transactions
abandoned may be rising despite increasing caution regarding the

18
See Monan Zhang, Investment Protectionism in the Name of National Security,
CHINA-US FOCUS (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.chinausfocus.com/financeeconomy/investment-protectionism-in-the-name-of-national-security
[https://perma.cc/TW2U-9E7G] (citing Thomson Reuters data detailing the
acceleration of China’s purchase of United States companies over ten years).
19
U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, CFIUS Annual Report to Congress, ¶ Table I-1
Covered Transactions, Withdrawals, and Presidential Decisions, 2010–2018,
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/CFIUS-Summary-Data-2014-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S7PF-RQAF].

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

2020]

U. PA. ASIAN L. REV.

13

investments that make up the underlying deal mix that is being
reviewed.20
The perception that recently stiffened CFIUS review policies
have disproportionately affected Chinese firms and investors has
some factual support—early in the Trump Administration, a number
of high-profile proposed acquisitions of United States firms by
Chinese buyers were blocked. 21 In particular, several of these
transactions were high-profile investments that attracted significant
attention in the business press. Among these blocked transactions
were potential acquisitions of the Grindr LGBTQ community app, the
MoneyGram money transfer service, and the health data startup
PatientsLikeMe.22 The targets of each of these investments were U.S.
firms with substantial access to sensitive consumer data. 23 But
because the objects of these investments did not fit a traditional
notion of national security-related infrastructure, such as ports,
20

See Primack, supra note 17 (reporting the considerable impact that CFIUS
activity has had on the deals between Silicon Valley investors and firms).
21
See China’s Ant Financial is Obliged to Abandon an American Acquisition,
ECONOMIST (Jan. 6, 2018), https://www-economistcom.proxy.library.upenn.edu/business/2018/01/06/chinas-ant-financial-isobliged-to-abandon-an-american-acquisition [https://perma.cc/HA83-U83L]
(providing an overview of several prominent Chinese attempted purchases of U.S.
businesses that were stopped by the Trump Administration).
22
See Harry L. Clark et al., Grindr And PatientsLikeMe Outcomes Show NonCleared Transactions’ Exposure to CFIUS Scrutiny, Especially When PII Is
Involved, MONDAQ (May 8, 2019),
https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/inward-foreign-investment/804096/grindrand-patientslikeme-outcomes-show-non-cleared-transactions39-exposure-tocfius-scrutiny-especially-when-pii-is-involved [https://perma.cc/QKZ3-NL8D]
(suggesting that U.S. blocking of Chinese investments in Grindr, MoneyGram and
PatientsLikeMe can be explained by the desire to protect Americans’ privacy
interest in their personally identifiable information).
23
See Simidjiyska, supra note 13 (stating that “[t]he Grindr and PatientsLikeMe
decisions strongly suggest that the [CFIUS] overseers are very concerned about
Chinese investment, particularly where sensitive personal data is involved” even
though these potential transactions predated the FIRRMA of 2018’s effective
date); Louise Lucas, Don Weinland & Shawn Donnan, Data Take Centre Stage as
Ant Financial Fails in MoneyGram Bid, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/fd22dd9c-f06d-11e7-b220-857e26d1aca4
[https://perma.cc/G88G-VGZB] (quoting an anonymous banker “with knowledge
of the MoneyGram deal say[ing] its demise was a ‘strong precedent for anything
involving personal data,’ extending national security concerns to a much broader
number of sectors”).
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aviation or defense-related electronics, their rejection by the CFIUS
was seen as unprecedented to observers. 24 In retrospect, CFIUS
opposition to these Chinese investments reveals a shifting
understanding of what constitutes national security.
A CFIUS Reboot
Reflecting a changing conception of national security
concerns, Congress recently passed legislation aimed at bringing the
CFIUS’s process and substance up to date; that legislation was
notably passed during the uptick in serious review of China-related
transactions.25 The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization
Act of 2018 (“FIRRMA”) changed CFIUS review in several ways,
formalizing the process, clarifying certain safe harbor countries and
defining industries and types of transactions that are likely to attract
strong concern.26
Procedurally, the FIRRMA transforms the CFIUS process
into a formal notification regime, similar in some ways to the HartScott-Rodino process for antitrust clearance. 27 Previously, the
CFIUS had a voluntary filing regime whereby a foreign investor
could choose whether to notify the CFIUS of its transaction before
closing.28 That said, prior to the FIRRMA, the CFIUS could review
a transaction even in the absence of notification. 29 The FIRRMA
makes formal notification mandatory; a foreign investor must submit
24

See Morrison & Foerster, CFIUS Means Business, Uniwinding Non-Notified
Transactions and Penalizing Non-Compliance with Mitigation Agreements, JD
SUPRA (Apr. 16, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/cfius-meansbusiness-unwinding-non-86555/ [https://perma.cc/Z8WH-W7JN] (listing the
Grindr and PatientsLikeMe acquisitions, in particular, among several
unprecedented CFIUS developments).
25
See e.g., Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018, Pub. L.
No. 115–232, §1701–93, 132 Stat. 1636, 2174 (2018) [hereinafter FIRRMA]
(aiming to change CFIUS processes to reflect the modern economic
environment).
26
Id.
27
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act is codified in 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a) (2016). Like the
FIRRMA, it sets forth a positive duty for investors to notify the government of a
covered transaction, as well as a time schedule for the review process.
28
F.T.C. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FISCAL YEAR
2004 (2004).
29
See Morrison & Foerster, supra note 24 (pointing out that the CFIUS had
“unwind[ed] non-notified transactions”).
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a declaration to the CFIUS at least 45 days before closing on any
transaction in which the foreign investor would acquire control of a
company that develops “critical technologies”—or by which the
foreign investor could gain “material non-public access” to those
technologies.” 30 Significantly, it also authorizes the Treasury
Department to create and maintain lists of “excepted investors” from
specific “excepted foreign states,” such as United States treaty allies,
that would potentially be exempt from the CFIUS process. 31
The FIRRMA’s changes to the substantive scope of CFIUS
review will likely create increased tension with Chinese investors—
though the source of that tension lies not simply in anti-China
sentiment, but in the changing nature of what is considered sensitive
in terms of national security. The key FIRRMA changes involve both
the degree of control triggering concern, as well as the specific
industries and technologies at issue. First, before FIRRMA, the
CFIUS could only block transactions that would result in foreign
control of a United States business.32 Under the prior understanding,
“control” in practice meant the ability to sell the company, enter or
30

Id.
Notably, the Department of the Treasury has issued somewhat contradictory
language regarding the strength of any potential safe harbor. See U.S. DEP’T OF
TREASURY, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON FINAL CFIUS REGULATIONS
IMPLEMENTING FIRRMA (Jan. 13, 2020),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/Final-FIRRMA-Regulations-FAQs.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6AGH-YVHY] (noting that while identifying Australia, Canada,
and the United Kingdom as the “initial excepted foreign states,” Treasury has also
stated that “[n]ot necessarily” “will every foreign person based in an ‘excepted
foreign state’ . . . qualify as an ‘excepted investor,’” and even if so qualified, the
“CFIUS retains the authority to review a transaction that could result in foreign
control of any U.S. business, regardless of whether the foreign person is an
‘excepted investor’”); see also supra note 28, at 5 (providing CFIUS with review
authority over transactions).
32
See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 31, at 2 (stating that FIRRMA
updated and strengthened CFIUS processes). See also Joseph V. Moreno et al.,
CFIUS Unbound: Foreign Investor Deals Continue to Draw Intense National
Security Scrutiny, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 1, 2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/cfius-unbound-foreign-investor-dealscontinue-to-draw-intense-national-security [https://perma.cc/8HPU-4PPT] (noting
that “Prior to FIRRMA, a “covered transaction” subject to CFIUS review was
limited to mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers by or with a foreign person that
could result in foreign “control” of any person engaged in interstate commerce in
the United States, and that could threaten the national security of the United
States”).
31
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leave contracts, close production facilities, and the like. 33 The
FIRRMA expands that jurisdiction to permit review of transactions
which give a foreign investor even just a noncontrolling stake in
certain industries, recognizing that even sub-majority ownership can
confer access and influence. 34
Additionally, the FIRRMA broadens the range of industries
that attract review. CFIUS review expands to cover foreign
investment in U.S. companies involved with critical technologies and,
crucially, the sensitive personal data of U.S. citizens. The FIRRMA
also includes a new focus on “material nonpublic technical
information.”35 Moreover, the FIRRMA authorizes the Department
of the Treasury to identify pilot industries of particular concern.
Alongside traditional national security-related concerns such as
aerospace and oceangoing vessel production, the initial named
industries included computers, semiconductors, wireless
communications, and electronic storage. 36
The FIRRMA and its implementing regulations, by
standardizing the CFIUS process, create increased certainty for
foreign investors and their US counterparties regarding the CFIUS
process. However, that increased certainty will not necessarily
diffuse trade tensions, particularly with China. In particular, the
focus industries that the Department of the Treasury has identified
pursuant to its FIRRMA authority include a number of areas that are
also priority industries under the “Made in China 2025” industrial
policy pursued by China’s central government; these areas include
such key industries as electrical equipment, materials science,
biopharmaceuticals, and most importantly for this Article,

33

Id.
Id.
35
Id. See also Jeffrey Richardson, CFIUS Review Authority Expands, JD SUPRA
(Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/cfius-review-authorityexpands-62714/ [https://perma.cc/5LUX-PRJP].
36
See Treasury Releases Interim Regulations for FIRRMA Pilot Program, U.S.
DEP’T OF TREASURY (Oct. 10, 2018), https://home.treasury.gov/news/pressreleases/sm506 [https://perma.cc/Y9V4-9ML5] (introducing the new regulations’
scope, purpose, and basic contents); see also CFIUS Laws and Guidance, U.S.
DEP’T. OF TREASURY (Feb. 13, 2020), https://home.treasury.gov/policyissues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-the-united-statescfius/cfius-legislation [https://perma.cc/K7DF-TETW] (releasing final CFIUS
regulations).
34
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information and communications technology. 37 However, any
attempt to deal with this tension runs into an ambiguity that serves as
a kind of roadblock: the United States’ own current lack of concrete
policies outlining its citizens’ fundamental interests regarding
information technology, including data privacy.

III.

CURRENT U.S. LAW: DATA PRIVACY LIKE NO ONE’S
WATCHING

What is generating the CFIUS’ tension with Chinese
investment in U.S. information technology is a two-part question that
goes beyond foreign investment: to what extent does United States
citizens’ data privacy matter, and what legal steps should be taken to
address that concern? Both parts of that question are the subject of
intense current discussion, and both parts are critical to why the
CFIUS has become increasingly active.
Data Privacy—What, Why and How Much?
Whether U.S. citizens should enjoy data privacy, and if so,
how much, is a leading question of the early twenty-first century.
Much as the development of portable, snapshot-capable film cameras
catalyzed Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’ 1890 landmark article
The Right to Privacy, 38 the increasing ability of firms and
37

See generally China to Invest Big in “Made in China 2025 Strategy,” XINHUA
NEWS AGENCY (Oct. 12, 2012),
http://english.www.gov.cn/state_council/ministries/2017/10/12/content_28147590
4600274.htm [https://perma.cc/LS7R-SVLQ] (introducing China’s “Made in
China 2025 Strategy”); see also Martijn Rasser, The United States Needs a
Strategy for Artificial Intelligence, FOREIGN POL’Y (Dec. 24, 2019),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/24/national-artificial-intelligence-strategyunited-states-fall-behind-china/ [https://perma.cc/X7AS-KRVY] (contrasting
relatively laissez-faire United States policy concerning its “technological edge”
with the “Made in China 2025 initiative—a wide-ranking industrial policy
intended to vault China into the select club of global technology powers”); James
McBride & Andrew Chatzky, Is ‘Made in China 2025’ a Threat to Global
Trade?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 13, 2019)
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/made-china-2025-threat-global-trade
[https://perma.cc/9BHR-7DBC] (listing 12 targeted sectors thought to be critical
and technologically advanced).
38
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
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governments to capture, store and process all manner of individuals’
information has driven a movement to bolster data privacy. Much as
with better cameras, better and more portable computing power has
driven shifts in how people live that has come with both benefits, such
as increased productivity and convenience, as well as costs in terms
of personal privacy.
That said, whether data privacy should be protected is still not
a matter of consensus. As the COVID-19 crisis has revealed, some
doubt that privacy needs protecting. 39 However, well before the
pandemic, Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg argued that privacy
was no longer a “social norm,” and so did not need protecting. 40
Similarly, about a decade ago, Google Chief Executive Eric Schmidt
had gone on record to question the need for data privacy, stating that
“if you have something that you don’t want anyone to know, maybe
you shouldn’t be doing it in the first place.” 41
While the antagonistic view of major tech titans may have
slowed the growth of interest in citizens’ data privacy in the United
States, it did not stop it. Survey data comparing citizens’ concerns at
the start of the twenty-first century and again in 2010 showed that
individuals had become increasingly concerned with companies
tracking their behavior online and then making the acquired data an
object of commerce.42 Technological change has forced regulators
such as the FTC to become involved in protecting citizens’
39

See Roy Cellan-Jones, Coronavirus: Privacy in a Pandemic, BBC (Apr. 4,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52135916 [https://perma.cc/ZCR2FQ6X] (quoting a Tweet concerning privacy concerns regarding COVID-19
tracking via smartphone, the former Portuguese Minister for Europe stating: “I am
more and more convinced the greatest battle of our time is against the ‘religion of
privacy.’ It literally could get us all killed.”); @MacaesBruno, T WITTER (Mar. 31,
2020, 9:12 PM), https://twitter.com/MacaesBruno/status/1245157022816968704.
40
Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/jan/11/facebook-privacy
[https://perma.cc/4PEY-QR4B].
41
Helen A.S. Popkin, Privacy is Dead on Facebook. Get Over It, NBC NEWS
(Jan. 13, 2010),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/34825225/ns/technology_and_sciencetech_and_gadgets/t/privacy-dead-facebook-get-over-it/#.XoeJW257mF0
[https://perma.cc/VBB2-UKNP].
42
See Annie I. Anton et al., How Internet Users Privacy Concerns Have Evolved
Since 2002, 8 IEEE SEC & PRIV. MAG., 21 (2010) (reporting changes over time in
systematic survey responses regarding consumer concerns).
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longstanding interest in their privacy, and lawyers, academic
commentators and policymakers have become increasingly active, at
least in specific sectors such as health and financial information
privacy.43
Despite citizens’ interest in their privacy in a technologically
shifting world, the United States continues to lack any general
national privacy legislation – in contrast to the European Union’s
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). 44 Does this mean that
Americans value their privacy less than Europeans? Not necessarily,
of course; the reality is that comparative difficulties in working
through the political process could also explain the lack of a United
States analogue to the GDPR. 45 Whatever the reason, the lack of
general data privacy law in the U.S. leaves the protection of consumer
information online largely to private ordering.
Foreign Investment in Data and the CFIUS as Placeholder
Without general privacy regulation, United States consumers’
online data is largely governed by private contracting, supplemented
with reputational enforcement.46 Doubts have arisen concerning the
43

See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, A Brief History of Information Privacy Law, reprinted in
PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY LAW IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 37–53 (Kristen J. Mathews, Proskauer Rose LLP eds., 2d ed.
2016) (outlining history of information privacy, including new targeted sectoral
regulation such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) and the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA)
enacted after the growth of the consumer-facing Internet).
44
See generally DIRK AUER & GEOFFREY A. MANNE, IS EUROPEAN COMPETITION
LAW PROTECTIONIST? (Int’l Ctr. for L. & Econ. eds., 2019),
https://laweconcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Is-European-CompetitionLaw-Protectionist-Issue-Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9U6-NRS7] (pointing out
this divergence in privacy policy, while noting that California did enact a statelevel general privacy law in 2018).
45
See Müge Fazlioglu, Tracking the Politics of US Privacy Legislation, IAPP
(Dec. 13, 2019), https://iapp.org/news/a/tracking-the-politics-of-federal-usprivacy-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/4ME8-XK23] (suggesting that the U.S.’
inability to adopt national privacy protection as the EU has with the GDPR
reflects not only a lack of interest in protecting privacy, but further exposes the
drawbacks of the U.S. political process and its veto points, including in
Congress).
46
See Thomas B. Norton, The Non-Contractual Nature of Privacy Policies and a
New Critique of the Notice and Choice Privacy Protection Model, 27 FORDHAM
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viability of a consumer sovereignty-based market solution to privacy
issues—it has become increasingly questionable whether consumers
can truly contract for their online privacy given asymmetries of
information and market power.47
Moreover, the contractarian rationale has failed in actual
application to protect consumers over the course of these transactions.
Specifically, while first-generation privacy scholarship predicted that
contract law would play a role in enforcing breaches of privacy
policies, courts have often concluded that privacy policies are
“general statements of policy rather than enforceable contracts.” 48
Additionally, network effects may prevent consumer choice from
being a shield against privacy harms. 49 In concrete terms, when one
has only weak competitive alternatives due to the choices of others
(e.g., join Facebook versus an alternative social networking service
that lacks one’s friends and family), one’s choices will not necessarily
resemble the Economics 101 product of voluntary actions in an
efficient market. Finally, behavioral economics has revealed some
weaknesses in the consumer-sovereignty/contractarian approach to
transactions in consumer data. 50 For example, studies of bounded
attention demonstrate that if users are distracted for even a couple of
seconds after being given a privacy policy, they significantly lower
their risk perceptions and become more amenable to consent;
moreover, consistent with other findings from behavioral law and
economics, consumers cannot easily value long-term risks associated
with the disclosure of personal information.51
This United States’ privacy regulation gap has drawn concern
from commentators and policymakers. Some worry about the
increasing power of data-rich monopolistic platforms to implement a
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 181, 187 (2016) (explaining why, without legal
requirement, “nearly all companies [in the United States] have a privacy policy”).
47
See John Mark Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets: Foundations, 164 U.
PA. L. REV. 149 (2015) (describing these arguments and critiquing them).
48
Norton, supra note 46, at 190.
49
See id. at 202–203 (concluding that the trend in case law renders privacy policy
breaches effectively “categorically immune” from consumers’ privately brought
breach of contract claims).
50
See Yoan Hermstrüwer, Contracting Around Privacy: The (Behavioral) Law
and Economics of Consent and Big Data, 8 J. INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. &
ELECTRONIC COM. L. 9, 16 (2017) (stating that consumers, even when partially
protected, may create market inefficiencies that erode their privacy rights).
51
Id. at 18–22.
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“market-driven coup from above” via “surveillance capitalism.” 52
Others question whether the United States’ approach positions the
nation well in a global race to develop critical artificial intelligence
capabilities.53 Finally, more practical concerns about cybersecurity
and the vulnerability of networked infrastructure—as highlighted by
the 2017 NotPetya attacks—have raised alarm concerning
unprotected data.54
The lack of general legal protections for data privacy goes
beyond foreign investment transactions. However, the recent draft
implementing regulations of the FIRRMA specifically make
transactions giving access to U.S. citizens’ “sensitive personal data”
a focus of CFIUS review.55 Viewed through the lens of the general
ambiguity concerning the current use of personal data, CFIUS review
can be seen as a placeholder or pause button. Lacking a consensus
about how to regulate and protect data privacy, the CFIUS is arguably
trying to minimize the data privacy harm to avoid having to
unscramble the eggs later. Because current privacy protections are
based on difficult-to-enforce consumer contracts, acquisition of
United States consumer data by Chinese firms, and especially
Chinese government-related or -controlled firms, potentially involves
harms that are not addressable via the current underdetermined
approach.56 The CFIUS’ activity concerning data privacy responds
to general legal and policy inaction.
52

SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR
A HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER 513 (2019).
53
See, e.g., KAI-FU LEE, AI SUPERPOWERS: CHINA, SILICON VALLEY, AND THE
NEW WORLD ORDER 102 (2018) (arguing that “China’s techno-utilitarian
approach gives it a certain advantage” and that the US needs a similar publicprivate synergy concerning data and AI in order to compete in the development of
AI technologies).
54
See generally ANDY GREENBERG, SANDWORM: A NEW ERA OF CYBERWAR AND
THE HUNT FOR THE KREMLIN’S MOST DANGEROUS HACKERS (2019) (describing
the rise of international cybersecurity concerns in light of a series of critical
attacks).
55
See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 31, at 5 (describing 2020 final
Treasury Department regulations implementing FIRRMA).
56
Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and
Privacy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 30, 2018),
https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-data-protection
[https://perma.cc/55E3-FS2Q] (explaining how the “United States lacks a single,
comprehensive federal law that regulates the collection and use of personal
information” and that what patchwork provisions exist are of uncertain power).
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CONCLUSION: BEYOND DATA PRIVACY TO
INFORMATION AND NARRATIVE CONTROL

While data privacy is part of the national security dilemma, it
may be more a start than an endpoint. Concerns about the foreign
control of new information and communications technology may go
beyond issues of blackmail, as may have been the case with the
CFIUS’ intervention in the acquisitions of Grindr and MoneyGram.
As a result, the CFIUS may face pressure to act vis-à-vis new gaps in
dealing with consumers and information platforms.
For example, at the start of 2020, a transaction under CFIUS
scrutiny exemplified this shift: the Chinese firm ByteDance’s
acquisition of the United States-based social media app Musical.ly,
which brought with it the basis for the wildly popular TikTok video
sharing platform.57 The concern with TikTok, particularly popular
with users 16 to 24, may not simply be that it has access to their
sensitive private information; it may also be the possibility that the
platform could be used to spread disinformation or manipulate
voters.58 In August 2020, President Trump issued an executive order
that would prohibit U.S. individuals and firms from engaging in any
transactions with TikTok.59 While the order cited TikTok’s capturing
“Americans’ personal and proprietary information,”60 voices in the
media have observed that Trump’s public concern with TikTok
appeared to follow its use by a social media campaign that tampered
with attendance at one of his pre-election rallies. 61
57

See David R. Hanke, TikTok National Security Problem: Don’t Ignore the
Lessons of 2016, HILL (Jan. 28, 2020),
https://thehill.com/opinion/cybersecurity/480251-the-tiktok-national-securityproblem-dont-ignore-the-lessons-of-2016 [https://perma.cc/HJH8-WFTZ]
(comparing potential of ByteDance, which also manages a Chinese state-owned
joint venture, to use TikTok to influence young voters to the alleged use by
Russian intelligence of Twitter and Facebook to affect the 2016 US national
election).
58
Id.
59
Exec. Order No. 13873 (Aug. 6, 2020),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-addressingthreat-posed-tiktok/ [https://perma.cc/4W3Y-U8R4].
60
Id.
61
Id. See also Dave Lee, TikTok to Sue Trump Administration over Ban, FIN.
TIMES (Aug. 22, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/78da8b5a-7a83-4692-afbb628e29025511 [https://perma.cc/E88M-K98E] (noting that “in June [2020], a
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Given concerns about the manipulation of the 2016 United
States national election, the review of the TikTok-related investment
may be warranted. 62 But this represents a different concern than
consumer data privacy—instead, the worry is about the manipulation
of information and the control of political narratives. The intersection
of so-called fake news and the political process is a problem that goes
beyond an interagency committee like the CFIUS and arguably
involves questions about epistemology and the nature of democratic
governance. The CFIUS alone cannot answer such questions; but it
surely can be pressed into action while the United States government,
media, and civil society engage with this question and other yetunknown data- and information-related questions that will arise. Is
this, as it has been accused of being, protectionism? Not in the way
we have previously understood that word, as in the service of national
mercantile gain. Instead, it is, at least in part, an attempt to shield
noneconomic values such as privacy, liberty and even less obvious
ones that are difficult to define and measure, but vital nonetheless.
“You don’t know what you’ve got ‘til it’s gone.’” 63

campaign that spread on TikTok was credited with inflating the expected turn out
of a Trump re-election rally in Tulsa, Oklahoma”).
62
See generally LEE, supra note 53 (stating that Tik-Tok could potentially be
used for espionage).
63
Joni Mitchell, Big Yellow Taxi (1970),
https://jonimitchell.com/music/song.cfm?id=13 [https://perma.cc/BZ3P-KXSW].
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